We study the e¤ects on the stock market of a securities transaction tax (STT). In particular, we focus on the recent introduction of a STT in Italy. Indeed, a peculiarity of the Italian STT is that it only concerns stocks of corporations with a market capitalization above 500 million euros. We exploit this feature via a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach (comparing taxed and non-taxed stocks both before and after the introduction of the new tax). We …nd that the new tax widened the bid-ask spread and increased volatility, while it left transaction volumes and returns substantially una¤ected. Results are broadly similar using a regression discontinuity design, in which we confront the performance of stocks just above the threshold with those just below.
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, taxation of the financial sector has become a hotly debated topic among economists and the general public. Indeed, the crisis highlighted serious externalities and asymmetric information problems in the financial system -therefore suggesting a possible role for properly-designed corrective taxes.
As a consequence, new taxes on the financial sector have been recently proposed and in some cases implemented. In particular, the crisis revamped discussions about the desirability of a Security Transaction Tax (STT). For example, significant steps towards an harmonized STT have been done in the European Union; in the meanwhile, France introduced in August 2012 an STT on French listed shares, and Italy did the same starting from March 2013.
The effects of the STT are highly controversial. As economic theory does not provide a clear-cut guidance, the question has ultimately to be answered on empirical grounds. In the present paper, we provide an empirical investigation of the impact of the Italian STT on the domestic stock market. Our empirical strategy relies on a peculiarity of the Italian STT, namely the fact that it only concerns stocks of corporations with a market capitalization above 500 million euros. We can exploit this feature of the rules by adopting a differences-in-differences strategy, confronting the change in the performance of stocks above the threshold with that of stocks below the threshold. Moreover, given the discontinuity embedded in the rules, we can compare the performance of stocks just above the taxable threshold with those just below, providing in this way a robustness check for our differences-in-differences results.
We find that overall the introduction of the STT induced a reduction in liquidity for the stocks hit by the reform. We also find some evidence that volatility of the "treated" stocks increased. The first result is in line with the theory, as the tax can be considered an increase in the transaction cost. The second result suggests that the impact of the STT on the instability-increasing activity of the noise traders has not been sufficient to compensate the disincentive effect on the stabilizing activity of informed agents.
Introduction

1
In the aftermath of the recent …nancial crisis, taxation of the …nancial sector has become a hotly debated topic among economists and the general public. For example, preexisting tax distortions may have contributed to the build-up of the excesses that ultimately triggered the crisis, such as excessive risk-taking and leverage, in ‡ated asset prices, the spread of structured …nance (e.g. Keen et al., 2010 , Keen and de Moji 2012 , Keen et al. 2013 , Ceriani et al., 2012 . Furthermore, the crisis highlighted serious externalities and asymmetric information problems in the …nancial system, therefore suggesting a possible role for properly-designed corrective taxes (Keen, 2010 , Shakleford et al., 2010 , Perotti and Suarez, 2011 . Finally, as the crisis deteriorated public …nances -partly due to the public support granted to distressed …nancial institutions -many governments need to rise additional revenues, and the …nancial sector appears to many an obvious contributor.
It is therefore not surprising that new taxes on the …nancial sector have been recently proposed and in some cases implemented (Keen, 2011a , Shakleford et al., 2010 , Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme, 2012 , IMF, 2010 , Devereux et al., 2013 . 2 In particular, the crisis also revamped discussion about the desirability of a Security Transaction Tax (STT).
In September 2011, the European Commission proposed a coordinated STT to be implemented in all member states. 3 In February 2013, the Commission proposed a directive on a harmonized SST to be implemented in 11 member states as a form of enhanced cooperation. While the initial proposals included all types of instruments, subsequently the eleven countries opted for a gradual implementation approach, possibly starting in 2016 with a tax on shares and related derivatives. The negotiation process is still under way. 1 The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re ‡ect those of the Bank of Italy or of the European Central Bank (ECB). We would like to thank Erich Battistin, Nicola Branzoli, Domenico Depalo, Antonio di Cesare, Giorgio Gobbi, Enrico Rettore, Giacomo Ricotti, Martino Tasso, seminar participants at the 108th conference of the National Tax Association and at the 27th conference of the Italian Public Economics Association (SIEP) for their useful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own responsibility.
In the meanwhile, France unilaterally introduced in August 2012 an STT on french listed shares, and Italy did the same starting from March 2013. 4 The e¤ects of the STT are highly controversial. As economic theory does not provide a clear-cut guidance, the question has ultimately to be answered on empirical grounds.
In the present paper, we provide an empirical investigation of the impact of the Italian STT on the domestic stock market.
Our empirical strategy relies on a peculiarity of the Italian STT, namely the fact that it only concerns stocks of corporations with a market capitalization above 500 million euros.
We can exploit this feature of the rules by adopting a di¤erences-in-di¤erences strategy, confronting the change in the performance of stocks above the threshold with that of stocks below the threshold. Moreover, given the discontinuity embedded in the rules, we can compare the performance of stocks just above the taxable threshold with those just below, providing in this way a robustness check for our di¤erences-in-di¤erences results.
The main contribution of the paper, with respect to previous similar studies, is given by the reliable identi…cation strategy provided by the quasi-experimental circumstances with which the STT has been introduced in Italy.
To give a preview of our results, we …nd that overall the introduction of the STT induced a reduction in liquidity for the stocks hit by the reform, while equity returns and exchanged volumes were una¤ected. We also …nd evidence that volatility of treated stocks has increased. Notice that we only observe the e¤ects of the STT on the regulated stock market. As we will discuss below, there are reasons to believe that the impact on over-thecounter transactions (for which the tax rate is twice as much) could have been stronger. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the empirical and theoretical literature concerned with the economic e¤ects of STTs. In Section 3, we summarize the features of the Italian STT, and in Section 4 we describe the dataset used in the empirical analysis. In Section 5 we spell out our empirical strategy and present our results. Section 6 concludes.
The theoretical literature on the STT is relatively small and does not reach a consensus on its e¤ects. Prima facie, following the introduction of the tax, gross-of-tax returns should rise, and trading volume should decrease. Indeed, both reactions make sense as investors try to mitigate the e¤ect of the tax on net-of-tax returns (Matheson, 2012 , Kupiec, 1996 , Lendvai et al., 2013 . However, the impact on returns also depends on capital mobility: if capital supply is imperfectly elastic, after-tax returns can be lower in equilibrium; the e¤ects on volumes can be instead exacerbated by migration of activities toward other markets and/or instruments.
On the contrary, the e¤ects on liquidity are ambiguous, depending among other things on the market micro-structure and on the exact measure of liquidity adopted (Subrahmanyam, 1998, Dupont and Lee, 2007) .
When it comes to the e¤ect of the tax on volatility, the disagreement is even stronger.
Proponents of the tax argue that it reduces volatility because it discourages the trading activity of destabilizing noise traders (Stiglitz, 1989, Summers and Summers 1989) . 5 The STT should therefore be considered as a "pigouvian" form of taxation. On the other side, it is also true that it discourages rational and stabilizing traders, so the overall e¤ect turns out to be theoretically ambiguous (Kupiec, 1996, Song and Zhang, 2005) .
To sum up, the question concerning the e¤ects of the SST has to be answered on the empirical ground.
In the seminal empirical paper on the subject, Umlauf (1993) studies the e¤ect of the introduction (in 1984) and of the subsequent increase (in 1986) of an STT in Sweden. 5 The erliest proposal can be probably found in a famous passage of Chapter 12 of Keynes' General Theory : "It is usually agreed that casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible and expensive. And perhaps the same is true of Stock Exchanges. That the sins of the London Stock Exchange are less than those of Wall Street may be due, not so much to di¤erences in national character, as to the fact that to the average Englishman Throgmorton Street is, compared with Wall Street to the average American, inaccessible and very expensive. The jobber's "turn", the high brokerage charges and the heavy transfer tax payable to the Exchequer, which attend dealings on the London Stock Exchange, su¢ ciently diminish the liquidity of the market (...) to rule out a large proportion of the transactions characteristic of Wall Street. The introduction of a substantial government transfer tax on all transactions might prove the most serviceable reform available, with a view to mitigating the predominance of speculation over enterprises in the United States".
He …nds a negative e¤ect on the aggregate stock market price, a large decrease in traded volumes, but no clear e¤ect on price volatility. 6 Subsequenty, Hu (1998) examines 14 tax rate changes in four Asian markets (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and Korea) from 1974 to 1994: he …nds that prices go down when the tax increases, and turnover (albeit less clearly) seems to decrease; no clear pattern emerges concerning volatility (it goes down in 6 out of 13 episodes). Baltagi et al. (2006) looks at the 1997 increase in the Chinese stamp duty tax and observe a signi…cant increase in volatility, but their results are otherwise in line with those of Umlauf (1993) and Hu (1998). 7 One important methodological limitation of the aforementioned studies is that they use simple di¤erence-of-means tests comparing market outcomes before and after the tax change. 8 This approach neglects the possibility that other market wide changes might confound the actual e¤ects of the tax change. 9 A step forward in this respect is made by Liu (2007) , which uses American Depository Receipts (ADR) of Japanese stocks -which are not subject to the home country's tax legislation -as a control group to assess a reduction in the Japanese STT which took place in 1989. However, the author himself admits that his strategy is problematic because, due to arbitrage, the prices of ADRs and of their "parent" stocks tend to closely move together. In the same vein, Bond et al. (2005) argue that the price e¤ects of an STT change are stronger for shares with higher turnover (because for them the present discounted value of future tax payment is higher). Therefore, they use high-turnover (resp. low-turnover) shares as the treatment (resp. control) group in a di¤erences-in-di¤erences analysis of the 1990 announcement of a reduction in the UK stamp duty tax. They …nd, in line with their argument, that high-turnover shares are more a¤ected by the reform. Their research design, however, has two limitations: …rst, the control group 6 Similar results are obtained if the stock market volatility is normalized dividing it by the corresponding volatility of the NYSE.
7 Phylatkis and Aristidou (2007) study the e¤ects of changes in the Greek STT. They estimate a GARCH model analogous to the one used by Baltagi et al. (2006) and …nd no e¤ect altogether of tax changes, neither on the mean nor on the volatility of daily returns. However, they …nd that the e¤ect on volatility becomes signi…cantly positive (resp. negative) if one looks at bullish (reasp. bearish) market periods.
8 Baltagi et al. (2006) complement their analysis estimating a GARCH model, but also in this case the e¤ect of the tax change is identi…ed via a time dummy equal to one in the post-reform period.
9 Similar limitations are to be found in the very small literature which studies the e¤ects of transaction tax rates on derivatives markets (see Chou and Wang, 2006) was also exposed to the treatment; second, the threshold value used to separate the control from the treatment group is arbitrary. 10 A full- ‡edged di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach has been adopted only very recently, to study the introduction in France of an STT in August 2012. In particular, Meyer et al. (2014) and Colliard and Ho¤mann (2013) compare the performance of French stocks with those of their British (Meyer et al., 2014) and Dutch (Colliard and Ho¤man, 2013) counterparts. Both studies …nd a negative e¤ect on volumes, but not on the bid-ask spread.
Colliard and Ho¤mann (2013) also …nd that volatility was not a¤ected by the tax. 11
Before concluding, it is also worth mentioning a related literature which does not look at STT changes but at the e¤ects of other portions of the overall transaction costs. An example is the size of the brokerage commission fees. In an early and in ‡uential paper, Jones and Seguin (1997) study the e¤ects of the shift from a …xed to a negotiated commission on transactions on the American stock exchange which took place in 1975. This change was followed by a sizable reduction in commissions. To assess the e¤ects of the change, Jones and Seguin (1997) use as a control group the Nasdaq index (Nasdaq transactions were indeed not subject to the change). They …nd that changes in volatility between the pre-reform and the-post reform period were proportionally more pronounced in the treated portfolio (for instance, NYSE/AMEX volatility moved roughly one-to-one with Nasdaq volatility before the reform, but fell to 75 % of Nasdaq volatility afterwards). However, Liu and Zhu (2009) …nd opposite results. They apply to the commission deregulation which took place in Japan in 1999 the same methodology of Jones and Seguin (1997) , albeit with a di¤erent control group (the portfolio of Japan ADR stocks).
The Italian STT
Starting from March 1st, 2013, the Italian government levies: (i) a tax on all transactions made -either by residents or non residents, and wherever the transaction occurs -in shares issued by Italian companies 12 , and (ii) a tax on high-frequency trading involving Italian shares. 13 The introduction of the new taxes was decided in December 2012 14 , but the details were spelled-out only in February 2013 15 .
For 2013, tax rates are set at 0,12% of the value of the transaction if it took place in regulated markets (or multilateral trading facilities) and 0,22% if it took place "over the counter". Concerning the tax on high frequency trading, buy or sell orders modi…ed or deleted are taxed with a tax rate of 0,02%, provided they happen within half a second and exceed a certain ceiling.
Some operations are exempted from the transaction tax: primary market transactions, temporary purchases of securities (such as repurchase agreements), intraday operations, intra-group transactions. Also, some subjects are exempted: the European Union, States, central banks, central clearing counterparts, market makers, mutual funds and pension funds. The exemption for market makers does not extend to OTC brokers operating as liquidity providers.
Finally -and crucially for our analysis -shares of corporations with a market capitalization below 500 million euros are exempted. This feature of the Italian reform is helpful for our purposes because -contrary to most previous empirical studies -it provides us with a natural split of our sample in a control (corporations with less than 500 million market capitalization) and a treatment group (corporations with more than 500 million market capitalization). Another crucial aspect of the reform is that the relevant capitalization is computed as of November 2012, i.e. at a date at which the tax was not yet discussed in the parliament. As we will discuss more at length below, this justi…es the assumption -which in turn underlies our identi…cation strategy -that corporations were not able to manipulate 1 2 The tax applies to both quoted and non quoted shares. It is formally paid by the buyer and it is calculated on the end-of-the-day net market value of the transactions. the treatment variable (market capitalization) in order to be sure to avoid the tax.
Dataset and descriptive statistics
Our analysis relies on daily prices of Italian stocks between March 2012 and September 2013 (i.e.12 months before and 6 months after the introduction of the …nancial transaction tax). 16 The number of listed Italian shares is around 320, but we exclude from the analysis preference and saving shares. Furthermore, we do not consider foreign shares which are not subject to the taxation. We also excluded 10 shares which were subject in the period covered by our analysis to abnormally large ‡uctuations (daily returns of above 50% in absolute terms; for all of them, we checked that these ‡uctuations could be clearly explained by reasons totally unrelated to the tax). The number of remaining shares ranges is around 240, among which around 70 are subject to the tax. 17
In Table 1 we show how the outcomes of interest changed after the introduction of the STT, with respect to the pre-reform period, distinguishing between the treated and the control group.
Following the introduction of the tax, traded volumes decreased for the treated shares, whereas they increased for the control group. Furthermore, gross returns increased for the treated shares, while they remained constant for the control shares. Bid-ask spreads decreased more in the control group than in the treated group (-0.8 against -0.1 percentage points). Finally, volatility, which was roughly the same in the two groups before the reform, decreased by almost twice as much among the control shares than among the treated ones.
In the next section we will see whether these results are robust to a more formal econometric analysis.
A complementary way to look at the data, often used in RD analysis, is proposed in The visual evidence provided in Figure 1 is in line with the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 : at the threshold it is possible to observe a discontinuous increase in the bid-ask spread and in the gross-of-tax returns, as well as a decrease in trading volume, in line with what one could expect in theory. We also observe a jump in volatility.
However, as it can be seen from the …gure, the number of observations near the threshold is very small (actually, for most corporations the relevant market values were either below As we will further discuss below, having few observations near the threshold makes it di¢ cult to capture precisely the change in the mean value of the dependent variables at the threshold.
Empirical strategy and results
As in the previous section, we will exploit two di¤erent sources of identi…cation. First, focusing on the longitudinal dimension of our data, we adopt a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach. Second, to complement this analysis, we exploit the sharp discontinuity in the treatment at a pre-set market capitalization value, resorting to a regression discontinuity (RD) design.
We take the di¤erences-in-di¤erences as our baseline because, while the RD approach assures a high degree of internal validity of our results (in particular, as we will argue below, it provides unbiased estimates under very weak conditions), RD uses only a small part of the information included in our data set. First, it ignores the period before the reform.
Second, it ignores what happens to the corporations whose market value is far from the treatment threshold. As a consequence, from a practical perspective RD leaves us with very few observations and imprecise estimates. Moreover, concerning the interpretation of our results, with RD we cannot say much about the e¤ects of the reforms away from the threshold -which is of course a very relevant issue. This notwithstanding, RD provides a useful check on the robustness of the di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates. 18
Di¤erences-in-Di¤erences estimation
The di¤erences-in-di¤erences method can be implemented by running the following OLS regression:
where the y i;t is the monthly average of the outcome variable; x i is the market value in November 2012; P ost t is a variable taking value of one in the period after the reform is implemented (i.e. from March 2013 onwards) and zero before; f (:) is a (possibly non linear)
function. Notice that we control for individual ( i ) and time ( t ) …xed e¤ects. The time span includes the year before and the six months after the reform.
We look at four outcome variables (y i ), namely: the monthly average of daily returns 19 , of the daily trading volume (proxied by the number of transactions) and of the bid-ask spread (expressed as a fraction of the bid price, in percentages), and the monthly standard deviation of daily returns.
Our estimates -shown in Table 2 -suggest that there is a signi…cant e¤ect of the reform on the bid-ask spread, which widens signi…cantly in the post-treatment period for the stocks subject to taxation, relative to those that avoided the treatment. From an economic viewpoint the e¤ect is substantial, being in most estimates of the order of 0.5%.
To put the estimated values in perspective, consider that the median bid-ask spread among the exempted stocks included in our exercises, for the month of March 2013, was about 0.7%.
Moreover, the di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates also suggest that the reform has increased volatility. Quantitatively, this latter e¤ect amounts to an increase of about 10%
(with respect to the median value for the exempted stocks in March 2013).
Di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates are potentially exposed to the econometric problem The di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach relies on the assumption that, without the treatment, the change in the outcome variable for the treated population would have been the same as the change observed for the control group, conditional on the control variables (common trend assumption). While the common trend assumption is not directly testable -as it relies on a counter-factual scenario -a simple eye-ball test does not seem inconsistent with the assumption (Figure 3 ).
There are some more formal ways to indirectly assess the plausibility of the common trend assumption. As a …rst check, we conduct a battery of "placebo" experiments, testing whether a signi…cant di¤erence in the dynamics of bid-ask spread and volatility between taxed and non-taxed stocks appears even in periods in which the treatment does not take place (in other words, we assessed the e¤ects of several "mock reforms"). To do this, we rerun several equation (1), changing each time the de…nition of the estimated is signi…cantly di¤erent form zero (which would signal a possible problem). It turns out that, in the six months before the reform, the placebo treatment seemingly had an e¤ect on bidask spreads only in two out of six cases, and it had never e¤ects in the case of volatility.
As a second check, another set of placebo experiments is performed using only non-taxed stocks. In particular, we pick at random a subset of them and pretend that they are treated;
we then run our baseline regression using this fake treatment group. The empirical density distribution of the estimate of the interaction term over the 200 replication of the described exercise, shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 , correctly suggests that the placebo treatment has no e¤ect. 20 All in all, the evidence seems to support the reasonableness of the common trend assumption. 
Regression discontinuity analysis
To test the robustness of our conclusion, we also pursue a di¤erent methodology, which rests on weaker identi…cation assumptions with respect to the di¤erences-in-di¤erences method.
Indeed, as we already mentioned, the way in which the Italian STT has been designed allows us to capture the average treatment e¤ect of the reform by using a RD design. Intuitively, RD is based on the comparison of stocks just above and just below the threshold in the period immediately after the reform, and rests on the assumption that -in the absence of the reform -the outcome variables would be a smooth function of capitalization.
More technically (see e.g. Lee and Lemieux, 2010, Imbens and , a RD strategy delivers unbiased results if for any unit i the expected values of the outcome variable y i if the unit is treated (y i (1)) and if it is not treated (y i (0)) are both continuos at the threshold value which separates treated from non treated units (which in our case is equal to 500 billion euros), conditional on the value of the variable which determines the treatment status (x i , which in our case is the market value in November 2012). If this is so, then the average treatment e¤ect at the threshold is given by:
Figure 5: Distribution of the point estimate of the treatment e¤ect ("Beta") in placebo experiments (Return volatility).
These continuity assumptions may not be plausible if agents are able to manipulate the running variable. McCrary (2008) develops a test of manipulation related to continuity of the density function with respect to the running variable (which in our case is market capitalization). Figure 6 reports the results of the McCrary test, and shows that the manipulation hypothesis can be rejected, as the density function does not show any discontinuity at the treatment threshold. Therefore, in our case the identi…cation conditions for applying the RD approach appear satis…ed.
Moreover, it can be shown (Lee, 2008) that the continuity of conditional regression functions assumption is satis…ed even if the units which receive the treatment are able to manipulate the treatment variable, to the extent that their are not able to do it perfectly.
This requirement is quite plausible in our set up, because the market capitalization which is relevant for assigning the treatment status is computed at a time (November 2012) before the tax was legislated. Corporations could not know, in November 2012, that the capitalization in that month would have been used as a threshold by a future law and, even if this were the case, no corporation would have been able to perfectly manipulate its market value in November 2012, in order to be sure to avoid taxation (notice also that the 500 billion threshold did not appear in any other law or regulation). As it is customary in RD settings, we estimate by running the following regression:
including only observations in an interval of the threshold capitalization.
As in any RD exercise, choosing the bandwidth around the threshold value involves a trade-o¤ between accuracy -the more data points, the lower the variance of the estimatorand the bias which is induced if f (:) is ill-speci…ed. Calonico et al. (2014b) suggest a method for choosing the bandwidth which is fully data-driven and -under certain conditionsasymptotically optimal. Table 3 shows that the Calonico et al. (2014) procedure suggests an interval of around 100/150 millions euros around the threshold, depending on the outcome of interest. Therefore, in the rest of the section, we provide results for two possible bandwidths:
in a …rst set of regression, we consider corporations with a market value between 400 and 600 million euros; in a second set of regressions we include all those between 350 and 650 billion euros. Concerning the function of the treatment variable (i.e. the average capitalization in November 2012), we consider both a linear and quadratic speci…cation.
We also used a speci…cation in which f(.) is linear but in which its slope at the right of the cut-o¤ point is allowed to be di¤erent from that at the left:
which is often used in applications.
Across all these exercises, results are quite robust. Note: Bandwidth in milions of Euro.
In the …rst row of Table 4 we study the e¤ects of the reforms in the month after its introduction (March 2013). Results are broadly in line with those obtained with the di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach. The coe¢ cient in the case of return volatility looses its statistical signi…cance but remains positive. This is easily explained by the large standard deviation of the RD estimates, due in turn to the very low number of observations.
The coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cant only in the case of the bid-ask spread, with a positive sign. It is also remarkable that the magnitude of the e¤ect is very similar to the that found in the di¤erences-in-di¤erences exercise.
One could doubt that one month is not enough to judge the e¤ects of the new tax.
However, when we consider the …rst quarter or the …rst semester after the reform, results do not change: the only variable a¤ected is the bid-ask spread, which widens by about the same amount irrespective of the time window considered (second and third rows of Table   4 ).
As suggested by Lee (2008) , we performed several "placebo" experiments running our baseline RD speci…cation on the months preceding the treatment (Table 7) . These tests broadly con…rm the lack of any discontinuity at the cut-o¤.
As a …nal exercise, we use the estimator suggested by Lemieux and Milligan (2008) which, in a sense, exploits at the same time both the margins that we separately used in the above sections. Indeed, it is an otherwise standard RD which exploits the pretreatment/post-treatment dimension by using as a dependent variable the change of the relevant outcome (in our case, the …rst di¤erence of the outcome between march 2013 and February 2013; of course we still consider only observations near the cut-o¤ capitalization value). This strengthens further the credibility of the results, because we are comparing the same stock before and after the treatment:
The results, shown in Figure 5 , are in line with our baseline estimates (standard errors are clustered at the individual stock level).
Concluding remarks
We provide an assessment of the stock-market e¤ects of the introduction of a transaction tax, by looking at recent quasi-experimental data from Italy. We found a signi…cant increase in the bid-ask spread. There is also evidence of an increase in the volatility of the taxed stocks.
The …rst result is in line with the theory, as the tax can be considered an increase in transaction costs. The second result suggests that the impact of the STT on the instabilityincreasing activity of the noise traders has not been su¢ cient to compensate the disincentive e¤ect on the stabilizing activity of informed agents.
As we remarked in the introduction, we only observe the e¤ects of the STT on the 
(1) (1)
(1) (March 2013 -February 2013 .
(1)
(1) The likely shift of transactions from the OTC to the regulated market is probably the main reason why we did not …nd evidence of a decrease in volumes on the regulated market.
Before concluding, let us remark some limits of our analysis. First,we cannot claim that our results can be extended to a tax design that di¤ers signi…canlty from the one of the Italian STT. 23 2 1 OTC trading, which takes place bilaterally and o¤-exchange, represents about 30% of the overall trading volume of the Italian equity markets. The OTC market is both an interdealer market and a client-driven market for large investors. Dealers and investors choose to operate on the OTC market mainly because it allows customization and limits the price impact of large trades. It also allows higher intermediation margins for brokers.
2 2 A less liquid OTC market translates into higher costs for market markers in regulated markets (which are not directly subject to the tax), because they rely on OTC transactions to manage inventories and reduce inventory-holding risks. This may be an additional channel through which the tax has widened bid-ask spreads.
